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Notes
LIABILITY OF THE PILOT-BAILEE
Common law rules have been applied to aircraft bailments since
the earliest cases on the subject were litigated. Although these
common law rules are still applied, bailments of aircraft raise
problems peculiar to the field of air law. The rights and duties of
the pilot-bailee are determined by this mixture of old and new
principles. To fully analyze the problem, it is necessary to note
and discuss the following: (i) the standard of care the pilot-bailee
is required to meet, (ii) the proof and presumptions applicable
to the bailment of aircraft and (iii) special circumstances that
may arise in the course of an aircraft bailment.'
I. THE STANDARD OF CARE
A bailment is a contract in which the personal property of the
owner is delivered to and possessed by another for a specific pur-
pose, either express or implied. When this purpose has been com-
pleted, the bailee must return the property to its owner.' There
are three classes of bailments: (i) those for the mutual benefit of
the bailor and the bailee, (ii) those for the exclusive benefit of the
bailee, and (iii) those for the bailor's exclusive benefit.' Each of
these classes has an attendant standard of care that the bailee must
exercise to preserve the bailed article.'
IBraman-Johnson Flying Service, Inc. v. Thomson, 167 Misc. 167, 3 N.Y.S.2d
602 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1938); Whitehead v. Johnson, 150 Misc. 86, 268 N.Y.S.
368 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1934). See also Colbert v. Franklin Limestone Co., 4 Av.
Cas. 5 17,754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955) for a discussion of this subject. Aircraft
bailments discussed in this note are limited to the field of general aviation.
2 See 44 A.L.R.3d 862 (1972) for a discussion of aircraft bailments on a
more general scale.
'R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 225-453 (1936). See also Simons v. First
National Bank of Denver, 491 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971) for a general dis-
cussion of aircraft bailments.
4R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 284 (1936).
5 Id. at 284, 289, 291. The mutual benefit bailment requires an ordinary stan-
dard of care; the bailment for the sole benefit of the bailee requires a high degree
of care; and the bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor requires only a slight
degree of care. See also Reynolds v. Bank of America National Trust and Savings
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The most important and commonly used type of bailment is
that for the mutual benefit of the contracting parties.! The courts
have traditionally held the bailee to the standard of ordinary care
under the circumstances in this type of bailment.' It is imperative
that the pilot-bailee clearly establish a mutual benefit relationship
with his bailor to avoid the higher standard of care demanded of
the gratuitous bailee. A comparison of two cases illustrates this
point. In Pattawatomie Airport and Flying Service v. Winger,"
defendant-pilot brought his plane to plaintiff-airport for repairs
and was given another aircraft by airport personnel for his tem-
porary use. Although the airport recognized some benefit from
receiving the pilot's repair business, the court reviewing the pilot's
subsequent accident in the bailed aircraft determined that the bail-
ment was gratuitous; i.e. the bailment was for the exclusive benefit
of the bailee. Applying the high degree of care standard demanded
of the gratuitous bailee, defendant was found liable for the damage
to the aircraft. In Hastings v. Thweatt,' defendant borrowed plain-
tiff's aircraft representing that he "might" buy it if the plane's
performance was adequate. Again the type of bailment created
was unclear. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals found that the
bailee's expressed desire to purchase the plane was sufficient to
create a mutual benefit bailment; therefore, applying the standard
of ordinary care, the bailee in Hastings was found not to be liable
for the damage the plane sustained.
Not only must the type of bailment be lucidly set out by the
parties, but the existence of the bailment relationship itself must
be established. The importance of this is noted in Serrano v. Mid-
yett." In Serrano, the pilot of a bailed aircraft was injured due to
Assoc., 335 P.2d 741 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), rev'd, 53 Cal. 2d 47, 343 P.2d
926 (1959) for a discussion on damages breaching bailees may be liable for.
'A lease is a mutual benefit bailment. See Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt, 475
P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1970); Hastings v. Thweatt, 425 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968); Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 12 Avi. L. REP. 5 583 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1972).
7 ld. See note 5 supra.
1176 Kan. 445, 271 P.2d 754 (1954).
1425 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
103 Av. Cas. 5 18,223 (Ill. Ct. App. 1953). See Simons v. First National
Bank of Denver, 30 Colo. App. 260, 491 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971). In
Simons, the owner left his plane on the premises of the alleged bailee. No bail-
ment was found, however, since the owner locked the aircraft, retained the keys
and discouraged anyone from disturbing it.
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the unairworthy condition of his plane. Although the bailor has a
duty to the bailee to provide an airworthy aircraft,' the Illinois
Court of Appeals determined that the pilot was in possession of
the aircraft by virtue of a conditional sales contract. Under this
relationship, the bailor had no duty to provide an airworthy plane.
Once the mutual benefit bailment is established, the pilot-bailee
must be certain he maintains the standard of ordinary care. The
Supreme Court has defined the standard of ordinary care as "that
care which men of ordinary prudence customarily take of their
own goods of a similar kind under similar circumstances.' What
constitutes ordinary care necessarily varies with the circumstances
under which the bailment is made. An airplane is a very expensive,
technical and potentially dangerous piece of equipment. The opera-
tion of an aircraft demands a high degree of skill. Therefore, the
standard of care to which a pilot-bailee must be subjected is very
high.'" It is a well established principle of air law that a pilot has
the primary responsibility for the operation of his aircraft;"' this
principle demands of pilots the most circumspect conduct possible.
The degree of care expected of pilots is illustrated by a recent
Texas Court of Civil Appeals case, Trevillian v. Albert." In Trevil-
lian, a doctor rented a plane in Texas with the intention of flying
it to southern Mexico. The doctor, however, collided with a moun-
tain top in transit completely destroying the rented aircraft. When
suit was brought by the bailor, the doctor claimed that he had be-
come disoriented after a long period of acceleration and that this
was a normal phenomenon. The court in Trevillian refused to
accept the argument finding that a prudent pilot would have used
the plane's instruments to keep himself oriented. Another case,
Fuelberth v. Splittgerber,'" provides further insight into a pilot-
bailee's standard of care. In this case, even though defendant-bailee
proved that the bailors had constructed their airfield's runway too
close to power lines, the bailee was found negligent when his leased
"See notes 28-30 infra and text accompanying.
12Preston v. Prather, 137 U.S. 604, 608 (1891).
13 Anderson Aviation Sales Company, Inc. v. Perez, 19 Ariz. App. 422, 508
P.2d 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973).
"'
4 Sawyer v. United States, 436 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1971); Rich v. Finley, 325
Mass. 99, 89 N.E.2d 213 (1949).
15469 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
" 150 Neb. 309, 34 N.W.2d 380 (1948).
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aircraft hit these power lines while landing because he was familiar
with their presence. The prudent pilot-bailee must take account of
the known negligence of his bailor."
Another important circumstance that tends to elevate the degree
of care that a bailee must meet when piloting an aircraft is the
comprehensive Federal Aviation Regulations.18 Violation of these
regulations is conclusive proof of negligence; e.g., if a pilot is only
licensed to fly under Visual Flight Rule conditions, 9 he will be
held accountable for damage occurring as a result of his flying at
night or in bad weather.'" The circumstances in McCouley v.
United State?' further illustrate this point. In this case, a pilot hit
a power line suspended ninety-four feet above the surface of a
lake. The applicable Federal Aviation Regulation prescribed that
pilots must maintain a minimum altitude of 500 feet.' The Ninth
Circuit found that "a pilot who flies in violation of federal regula-
tions is negligent as a matter of law ....
The ordinary degree of care under the circumstances standard
does not unduly favor the bailor. There are at least three factors
that tend to alleviate the bailee's susceptibility to liability. The
decision in Upper Valley Aviation v. Fryer" illustrates one factor.
In this case, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found that although
a pilot is expected to exercise a high degree of care in the opera-
tion of an aircraft, the burden need not be carried to extremes.
Here, the pilot checked the gas gauge in his aircraft, but did not
bother to look into the gas tank to make sure the guage was cor-
rect. Subsequently, the plane crashed, having run out of fuel in
flight. The pilot proved that the fuel gauge was inaccurate; this
negligence on the part of the bailor exonerated the bailee from
17 Id.
Is 14 C.F.R. § 91 (1973). Beyond these federal safety regulations, the state
law regarding bailments controls. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 has not pre-
empted state law in the area of aircraft bailments. Rogers v. Ray Gardener Flying
Service, 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970).
19 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.105 - 91.109 (1973). Generally, the Visual Flight Rules
provide minimum standards of visibility (three miles) and altitude with which
pilots without instrument ratings must comply.
"See Hall v. Osell, 102 Cal. Ct. App.2d 849, 228 P.2d 293 (1951).
21470 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1972).
2"Id. at 139.
23470 F.2d 137, 139. Accord, Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corp., 268 F.
Supp. 599 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
' 392 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
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liability. The ordinary care standard does not require that the pilot-
bailee engage in any conduct or take any precaution not ordinarily
taken under the circumstances.'
The second factor that tends to alleviate the bailee's liability is
that the pilot-bailee is not expected to take account of facts beyond
the normal range of a pilots' competence. In Atlantic Aircraft
Distributors v. Rankin," the bailees attempted a parachute jump
from the wing of a leased aircraft. The presence of the jumper on
the wing caused the plane to crash. In dismissing the bailor's suit
against the bailees, the Superior Court of Baltimore, Maryland,
concluded that a bailment requires only ordinary care and that
knowledge of the parachutist's effect on the aerodynamics of the
plane's wing was beyond ordinary comprehension. 7
Thirdly, the duty of care the bailor owes the bailee in a mutual
benefit bailment tends to limit the bailee's liability. The bailor of
aircraft is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to provide an
airworthy aircraft; 8 this duty extends to any latent defect that
could have been discovered in the exercise of ordinary care.' If
the bailee can prove that the injury to the bailed aircraft was due
to the bailor's lack of care, the bailee will be absolved of fault and
the bailor will be held liable. The court in Anderson Aviation
Sales Company v. Perez"' noted that the bailor must also exercise
ordinary care in checking the qualifications of pilots seeking to
lease planes. In this case, the Arizona Court of Appeals found that
the bailor had neglected to ascertain a pilot-bailee's qualifications;
therefore, the bailor was held primarily responsible for the damage
caused when the pilot crashed.
"See Falls Church Airpark Co. v. Mooney Aircraft, 254 F.2d 920 (5th Cir.
1958). In this case, the court determined that the bailee did not have to inspect
the plane's engine for a cracked oil line before take-off.
263 Av. Cas. 5 18,042 (Super. Ct. Md. 1952).
27 See Lunsford v. Tucson Aviation Corp., 73 Ariz. 277, 240 P.2d 545 (Ariz.
1952).
2 D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Aircraft Sales and
Service v. Gantt, 255 Ala. 508, 52 So.2d 388 (1951). See also Bachner v. Pear-
son, 479 P.2d 319 (Alas. 1970) where the court applied the doctrine of strict
liability to commercial leases.
29 Southeastern Air Service v. Crowell, 88 Ga. 820, 78 S.E.2d 103 (1953);
Stevenson v. Reimer, 240 Iowa 652, 35 N.W.2d 764 (1948).
30 19 Ariz. App. 422, 508 P.2d 87 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973). See Boyd v. White,
128 Cal.2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Central Flying Service
v. Criggs, 215 Ark. 400, 221 S.W.2d 45 (1949).
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II. BURDEN OF PROOF
The circumstances giving rise to Sky Aviation Corp. v. Colt1
illustrate the major problems of proof in aircraft bailment cases."
In Sky Aviation, a pilot-bailee had successfully landed his aircraft
at a Wyoming airport and proceeded to taxi toward a hangar.
Before the pilot reached the hangar, however, his high-winged
plane was struck by a strong cross-wind and was flipped onto its
back causing extensive damage. The bailor, who was the proponent
of the action against the pilot, had the initial burden of proof. The
bailor could meet this burden by either of the following: (i) alleg-
ing and proving specific acts of negligence and/or (ii) asserting a
presumption of negligence against the bailee." This presumption
will arise when the bailor proves these facts: (i) the existence of
the bailment contract, (ii) delivery of the bailed article to the
bailee and (iii) that the bailee either failed to return the article
or returned it in a damaged condition." When these simple proofs
are made, the bailor has made a prima facie case for recovery.'
In Sky Aviation, the bailor asserted both specific acts of negligence
(i.e. that the bailee had refused the aid offered by airport employees
to hold down the plane even though he was aware of the danger
that high winds created for light, high-winged aircraft) and the
presumption of negligence.' Once the presumption was raised and
1475 P.2d 301 (Wyo. 1970).
'See generally Brodkey, Practical Aspects of Bailment Proof, 45 MARQ. L.
REV. 531 (1962).
"If the bailee alleges negligence on the part of the bailor, he must do so
without the aid of a presumption; he must assert and prove specific acts of negli-
gence. See Clark v. Chishop, 241 P.2d 171 (Idaho 1952); Kernek v. Masterson,
311 Ky. 826, 226 S.W.2d 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950); Farish v. Canton Flying Serv-
ices, 214 Miss. 370, 58 So.2d 915 (1952); Stone v. Farmington Aviation Corp.,
360 Mo. 1015, 232 S.W.2d 495 (1950).
'See Son v. Carter, 450 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Henon v. Penn-
Air, 8 Av. Cas. 5 18,053 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
'There is a difference of opinion among the courts in defining what a prima
facie case is. Does it mean that plaintiff has made enough of a case to go to the
jury, i.e. one qualitatively sufficient to cause reasonable minds to differ; or does
it mean that the case is not just strong enough to go to the jury, but is strong
enough to require a directed verdict for the proponent if defendant does not come
forward with evidence? See Brodkey, Practical Aspects of Bailment Proof, 45
MARQ. L. REV. 531, 534-7 (1962).
"0 There is a strong similarity between the presumption applied in bailment
cases and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Some courts have applied this doctrine
in bailment cases rather than the presumption. See Lejeune v. Collard, 44 So.2d
504 (La. Ct. App. 1950); Wehkamp v. Garden City, 187 Kan. 310, 356 P.2d
the proper elements were shown, the bailee had the burden to
come forward and produce evidence proving he had not breached
his duty and that the damage resulted from other causes.37 Here,
the bailee attempted to rebut the presumption by claiming that the
accident was caused by an act of God. The court in Sky Aviation
concluded, however, that the damage resulted more from defen-
dant's negligence than from nature and rendered judgment for the
bailor on the basis of the presumption."
There is sound reason for raising the presumption of negligence
in bailment cases. In the usual bailment situation, a chattel is
entrusted to a bailee who has exclusive control and custody over it;
therefore, he is normally in sole possession of any evidence explain-
ing the circumstances attending the loss or damage. In Northeast
Aviation Company v. Rozzi," the bailee, who crashed his leased
aircraft into the Atlantic Ocean where it sank, was the only person
having direct knowledge of the accident. In these cases, the bailor
is at the mercy of the bailee unless the bailee can be forced to
come forward with evidence.'
III. SPECIAL BAILMENT SITUATIONS
Even though the pilot-bailee's liability is measured by the stan-
dard of ordinary care under the circumstances, the degree of care
expected of him in the operation of bailed aircraft is very high.
This factor, together with the presumption of negligence, would
seem to place the pilot-bailee in a disadvantaged position in a
suit brought against him by the bailor. This situation may be
altered, however, under a number of special circumstances.
826 (1960). The similarity between these two theories is illustrated by the ele-
ments the proponent must show to recover via res ipsa locquitur: (i) the event
must be the sort that does not ordinarily occur without negligence, (ii) the in-
strumentality must have been in the exclusive control of defendant and (iii)
plaintiff cannot have been guilty of contributory negligence. W. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS 214 (4th ed. 1971).
" See Graham v. Rockman, 504 P.2d 1351 (Alas. 1972); Son v. Carter, 450
S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
"See Falls Church Airpark Co. v. Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 254 F.2d 920 (5th
Cir. 1958). In this case, defendant-bailee successfully rebutted the presumption of
negligence.
39 144 Me. 47, 64 A.2d 26 (1949). For a more recent decision discussing this
issue, see Graham v. Rockman, 504 P.2d 1351 (Alas. 1972).
4 See Comment, 31 TEXAS L. REV. 46 (1953); 14 STAN. L. REv. 200 (1961).
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A. The Student Pilot
The inexperience of student pilots and the knowledge of this
inexperience on the part of the bailor present a unique bailment
situation. In this situation, the underlying problem the courts must
face is to differentiate between the student pilot's lack of skill and
his lack of care.
The ordinary care under the circumstances standard applies in
all bailment situations. Most courts recognize, however, the stu-
dent pilot's comparative lack of skill as a circumstance within the
general standard that tends to lower the degree of care required. "1
In Vee Bar Airport v. De Vries,"' a student pilot stalled his plane's
engine and crashed while attempting a difficult maneuver. Although
noting that an experienced pilot with a high degree of skill could
have avoided the accident, the court in Vee Bar Airport determined
that this degree of skill could not be expected of student pilots.
Any damage attributable to the student's lack of skill was one of
the risks the bailor assumed in its training program.
Bailors are more susceptible to liability when a student is the
bailee. Although a pilot must assume the risk of those known and
appreciated dangers incident to flying, these assumed risks will
necessarily be fewer when a student is the bailee since his experi-
ence is not as great. For example, a flying school that allows an
inexperienced student pilot to take-off into an area susceptible to
violent down-drafts cannot successfully claim assumption of the
risk as a defense when sued for this negligent conduct."
Student pilots may, however, be held liable for damaging their
bailed aircraft under certain circumstances. In Jones v. O'Bryon,"
a student ineptly performed a landing resulting in the demolition
of the plane he was flying. The Iowa Supreme Court found that
the student was liable for the loss even though the bailor had
assumed the risk of the natural and usual incidents of a student's
using his plane; defendant, according to the court, had not con-
ducted himself with the care that might reasonably be expected
" Some courts do not recognize a different standard for student pilots. See
Ambassador Airways v. Frank, 12 P.2d 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1932); Bailey v. In-
surance Co. of North America, 80 Ga. 521, 56 S.E.2d 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 1949).
73 S.D. 356, 43 N.W.2d 369 (1950).
"Lunsford v. Tucson Aviation Corp., 73 Ariz. 277, 240 P.2d 545 (1952).
"254 Iowa 31, 116 N.W.2d 461 (1962).
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even of a student. The courts will protect the student-bailee only
to a limited degree. Students are charged with having: (i) knowl-
edge of the basic rules and regulations of flying aircraft, (ii) com-
mon sense and (iii) retained knowledge of their training. A stu-
dent pilot who fails to utilize these resources will be found negli-
gent.'
B. Contractual Alteration
Since a bailment is a contract, the parties to it are free to alter
the usual bailment relations; a bailee's liability may be either ex-
tended or limited by the terms of the bailment contract." This is
exemplified by the circumstances in Leeds v. Mundy,"' where the
bailor absolved himself of the duty to provide an airworthy air-
craft. A term of the bailment contract provided that the bailee
could not rescind the contract for any mistake or constructive
fraud relating to the condition of the leased aircraft. Because of
this clause, when the leased plane was later found to be defective,
the bailee was not allowed to rescind the contract.
In Davies Flying Service v. United States,"" the bailor entered
into a bailment contract with the Civil Aeronautics Administration
agreeing that the CAA could use the bailor's planes whenever
necessary. The pertinent part of the contract read:
The contractor shall assume full responsibility for loss of or dam-
age to the rented aircraft, and agrees to save the [g]overnment
harmless from liability for damage to the property of and injury
to or death of third persons, except due to negligence on the
part of the [g]overnment."
Later, one of Davies' planes piloted by a CAA employee crashed,
I See Morton v. Martin Aviation Corp., 205 Tenn. 41, 325 S.W.2d 524
(1959). In this case, the student-bailee was given instruction on the use of his
plane's reserve tank. When the plane ran out of fuel and crashed, the student
was held liable for the loss to the bailor because he did not use his reserve fuel.
48 Brodkey, Contractual Limitation of Bailee's Liability in Illinois, 8 DE PAUL
L. REV. 25 (1959). The parties may not, however, completely exempt themselves
from liability. Id. See Silvestri v. South Orange Storage Corp., 14 N.J. Super. Ct.
205, 81 A.2d 502 (1951). In Central Bucks Aero, Inc. v. Smith, 12 Avi. L. REP.
5 17,927 (Pa. C.P. 1973), a twenty year old pilot rented an aircraft and subse-
quently crashed it. Although the pilot-bailee was found to have been negligent,
he could not be held liable for damages because the tort arose out of a contract
that he disaffirmed as a minor.
4'212 Va. 475, 184 S.E.2d 751 (1971).
48 216 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1954).
41 Id. at 105.
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killing all those aboard and completely destroying the aircraft.
Since no evidence could be obtained indicating specific acts of
negligence by the bailee, the bailor raised the presumption of neg-
ligence. The Sixth Circuit, however, found that the contract forbade
the use of the presumption. The contract was interpreted to mean
that the bailor could only hold the bailee liable if actual negligence
was proved. Because no evidence was available, the complaint
was dismissed."
Oral warnings or instructions may be considered part of the
bailment contract. In Whitehead v. Johnson,1 the bailor warned
the bailee of a plane with two cockpits that the aircraft tended
toward "nose-heaviness" when operated from the front cockpit
without a passenger in the rear compartment. Despite this oral
warning, the pilot-bailee flew the plane from the front cockpit and
"cracked up" when the plane nosed down while landing. The
municipal court found that the bailor's admonition had become a
condition of the bailment contract and that the bailee had breached
it." By the same token, any assurances by the bailor regarding the
condition or performance of his aircraft may become a term of the
bailment. In Rutherford v. Page," the bailor, during negotiations
prior to the creation of the bailment contract, claimed that his air-
craft had recently undergone a complete overhaul and was in ex-
cellent condition. When it became apparent to the bailee that the
bailed plane did not measure up to these assertions, he was allowed
to rescind the agreement."'
C. Unauthorized Use
A bailee may be held liable for damage sustained by his bailed
aircraft during an unauthorized use. The courts have had no dif-
ficulty in finding a breach of contract and liability when the pilot-
bailee has knowingly permitted the unauthorized use." In Seale v.
"
0See Neel v. Henne, 30 Wash.2d 24, 190 P.2d 775 (1948).
5' 150 Misc. 86, 268 N.Y.S. 368 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1934).
See Martin School of Aviation v. Bank of America, 48 Cal.2d 689, 312 P.2d
251 (1957). Although the bailor failed to establish that the term had become a
part of the contract, it was asserted in the case.
s3429 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
Terms may impliedly become a part of the bailment contract through pre-
vailing trade usage. See Tursair Executive Aircraft Service, Inc. v. United States,
383 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1967).
55Any use of an aircraft beyond the terms of the bailment contract may be
NOTES
White,"6 the bailee was given possession of the bailor's plane for
the express purpose of selling it. The bailee was authorized to dis-
play the aircraft and even give demonstration rides in it. When,
however, the bailee wrecked the plane when using it for personal
enjoyment, the contract was breached."
Further problems arise when the unauthorized use takes place
without the knowledge of the bailee. In Lewis v. Jensen,"8 the bailee
left the bailor's plane overnight in an open hangar with the key
in the ignition. During the night, two intoxicants appropriated the
aircraft and crashed it into a nearby hillside. Although the bailee
had not authorized the illicit use, the Washington Supreme Court
found him liable for the damage holding that a bailee's duty to
the bailed aircraft extends to the storage of the aircraft as well as
its operation." Had the bailee in Lewis exercised due care in at-
tempting to prevent the theft, he could have escaped liability.
D. Emergency
An emergency is another circumstance that may affect the
standard of care the bailee of an aircraft is expected to exercise. A
pilot exercising ordinary care cannot be expected to avoid unex-
pected and unforeseen circumstances. The conduct, required, how-
ever, is still that of the reasonable man under the circumstances;
the emergency is merely one of the circumstances.'
In Shaw v. Carson,"' the bailee experienced serious difficulties
with the engine of his leased aircraft; a forced landing was neces-
sitated in which the plane was damaged. The bailee was not held
regarded by the bailor as a conversion. See Trans-Alaska Telephone Co. v. Flight-
craft, Inc., 353 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1965).
" 217 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
"The bailee's liability for breach of contract was based on the unauthorized
use rather than negligent operation. See Southeastern Air Service, Inc. v. Carter,
78 Ga. App. 8, 50 S.E.2d 156 (1948); Ogden v. Transcontinental Airport of To-
ledo, 39 Ohio App. 301, 177 N.E. 536 (1931).
'139 Wash.2d 301, 235 P.2d 312 (1951).
"See Messer v. Southern Airways Sales Co., 246 Ala. 287, 20 So.2d 585(1945); City of Enid v. Reiser, 355 P.2d 407 (Okla. 1960).
60 An emergency is a sudden and unexpected event that deprives the actor of
the opportunity to deliberate and consider his decision. The actor may not assert
emergency as a defense if it has been created through his own negligence. Some
emergencies must be anticipated when the actor engages in an activity in which
they are likely to arise. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 169-70 (4th ed. 1971).
1218 Iowa 1251, 257 N.W. 194 (1934).
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liable for the loss since the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that
his conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.
When claiming the "emergency" defense, a defendant has the
burden of proving each of the following: (i) that the exculpatory
situation existed, (ii) that the damage was caused by forces beyond
his control and (iii) that he exercised due care under the circum-
stances." The pilot-bailee in Priester v. Judkins claimed to have
been subjected to a similar set of circumstances that existed in
Shaw. In this case, however, defendant-bailee failed to meet his
burden by establishing that an emergency existed." Defendant's
conduct was found to be substandard without proof of an emer-
gency situation."
E. Agency
The character of the relationship between the pilot and the
bailee may also affect the bailee's liability." The federal district
court in Aviation Associates of Puerto Rico v. Dixon Company"
was confronted with this problem. Aviation Associates had pur-
chased a plane in Florida and employed the Dixon Company to
pilot the aircraft to Puerto Rico. Dixon assigned this task to John-
son who negligently crashed the plane into the Caribbean. The
issue of whether Johnson was an agent of Dixon was determinative
of Dixon's liability. The court in Aviation Associates found John-
son to be an employee of Dixon who was therefore held liable for
Johnson's negligence. The Louisiana Court of Appeals in Kamm
v. Morgan" discusses this issue more fully. In Kamm, the pilot of
a bailed seaplane negligently caused it to sink in the Mississippi
River while being used in the pilot's crop-dusting business. The
court in Kamm found that the pilot had a contract with the Norris
" See Naxera v. Wathan, 159 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1968); Portland Flying
Service Inc. v. Smith, 227 A.2d 446 (Me. 1967); Jones v. O'Bryon, 254 Iowa 31,
116 N.W.2d 461 (1962).
7 111. App.2d 414, 129 N.E.2d 583 (1955).
The plane's engine was proved to have worked well both before and after
the accident.
"See Graham v. Rockman, 504 P.2d 1351 (Alas. 1972) for a more recent de-
cision on this subject. In Graham, the bailee claimed a sudden down draft and
air turbulence caused his crash.
"6See Hillend v. Koltsch, 183 Or. 460, 192 P.2d 274 (1948); United Air
Services v. Sampson, 30 Cal. App.2d 135, 86 P.2d 366 (1939).
67333 F. Supp. 982 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
68 157 So.2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
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Pest Control Service wherein Norris allowed the pilot to use its
name and billing facilities; in return, the pilot gave Norris fifteen
per cent of his profit. Norrie escaped liability, however, when the
Court of Appeals found its relationship to the pilot to be that of an
independent contractor."9
The more usual agency problem in bailment cases is illustrated
by the fact situation in Shook v. Beals."' In this case, four nonpilots
combined their resources to rent a plane and to hire a pilot for a
weekend fishing trip. Even though none of the four bailees were
capable of flying the plane, they were found to be in a joint venture
and equally liable for the destruction of the aircraft due to the
negligence of their pilot. The California Court of Appeals noted
in Shook that a bailee must be in exclusive control of the bailed
article before a bailment situation will arise. "Control" was found
because the purpose and the direction of the flight were charted
by the nonpilot-bailees even though they lacked actual physical
control.
IV. CONCLUSION
This summary of the case law regarding aviation bailments
verifies that the pilot-baliee's obligations will generally be governed
by principles of common law. The ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances standard, however, has undergone a great deal of alter-
ation due to the advent of aircraft. The pressures created by the
complexity and potential danger of improperly operated aircraft,
the principle of air law that the pilot must assume primary re-
sponsibility for the safety of his aircraft and the Federal Aviation
Regulations have all worked to elevate the degree of care the pilot-
bailee must exercise. These circumstances operating within the
ordinary care standard have raised the ordinary care expected of
the bailee of aircraft almost to that expected of the gratuitous
bailee. The common law presumption of bailee negligence has also
had the effect of increasing the bailee's liability.
" The court in Kamm notes the distinction between an agent and an inde-
pendent contractor. There is no agency relationship unless the employer can di-
rect the manner in which the employee performs his work; if the employer is
only interested in the end result and retains no right to supervise the manner in
which the work is done, he is dealing with an independent contractor.
"°96 Cal. App.2d 963, 217 P.2d 56 (1950).
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The net effect of this intermingling of old common law rules
with the newer principles of aviation has been the creation of a
unique and very strict standard of care. Although there are several
"alleviating factors" and "special situations" that may have some
effect, it is evident that they will not be applicable in many damage
suits arising from bailment contracts. For the most part, the pilot-
bailee must face the onerous ordinary care under the circumstances
standard, the presumption of bailee negligence and a distinct prob-
ability of liability.
Robert F. Maris
